Introduction
A primary concern of Stanley Cavell's Carus Lectures is to respond to the question posed in the first sentence of the Introduction: "Is Moral Perfectionism inherently elitist?" 1 By elitist, he means undemocratic. While there are senses in which he would not want to deny that Moral Perfectionism is elitist, and while he admits that there are perfectionisms that do not require democracy, neither of these are Cavell's concern. Rather, he wants to show that his preferred version of perfectionism, variously named Moral, Emersonian and Nietzschean perfectionism, is a perfectionism that happily consents to democracy, and whose criticism it is the honor of democracy not only to tolerate but to honor, called for by the democratic aspiration. 2 In other words, Cavell's response to the charge of elitism is to argue that his preferred perfectionism is necessary for the maintenance of a truly democratic society. His argument proceeds partly by way of critical engagement with John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, a work that he admires in part for the manner in which this book establishes a systematic framework for the criticism of constitutional democracy from within. 3 His disagreement with Rawls is a product of Cavell's own commitment to such criticism of democracy, as he says: Wilde and George Bernard Shaw. As he understands it, perfectionism is not so much a particular conception of the moral life as it is "a dimension" of the moral life that involves a concern with "the state of one's soul" and that places particular weight on "the possibility or necessity of the transforming of oneself and of one's society." 7 On this view, being a moral person must be understood to involve a capacity for selfcriticism and self-transformation. Cavell's Emersonian perfectionism involves a conception of the person as always complete but also oriented towards his or her "next" state of being. In this sense, it is a self that is always oriented towards an "unattained but attainable self" and the capacity for self-criticism that is an important part of being a moral person may be redescribed as "the capacity to consecrate the attained to the unattained self." 8 Importantly, the character of this unattained self is a function of the self that seeks it:
I do not read Emerson as saying […] that there is one unattained/ attainable self we repetitively never arrive at, but rather that "having" "a" self is a process of moving to, and from nexts. It is, using a romantic term, the "work" of (Emerson's) writing to present nextness, a city of words to participate in. 9 From Emerson and from Nietzsche Cavell takes the idea that embracing this kind of perfectionism and dedicating ourselves to the next self requires that we become ashamed of our present selves, or that in some sense we come to hate our present selves. 10 One of the dangers associated with such moral aspiration to a higher or bet- 7. Ibid., 2. 8. Ibid., 8, 49. 9. Ibid., 12. 10. Ibid., 16 . Deleuze and Guattari similarly point to the feeling of shame as "one of philosophy's most powerful motifs." Invoking the shame of being human that Primo Levi identifies in relation to the Nazi camps, they suggest that we also experience such shame "before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and of ter state of oneself and the world is that it will fail and lead to cynicism, or worse. For Cavell, Emersonian perfectionism provides means to withstand such cynicism and protect us from despairing the possibility of achieving the good of which we are capable:
If there is a perfectionism not only compatible with democracy but necessary to it, it lies not in excusing democracy for its inevitable failures, or looking to rise above them, but in teaching how to respond to those failures, and to one's compromise by them, otherwise than by excuse or withdrawal. 11 It is at this point that Cavell's conception of perfectionism engages with the limitations of Rawls' criticism of democracy from within in A Theory of Justice. He takes it that Rawls addresses the aim of teaching citizens how to respond to the inevitable failure of actual democracies to live up to their ideals by suggesting that a life lived in accordance with the principles of justice as fairness is a life that is "above reproach." 12 Cavell takes issue with this response, suggesting that looking for a life that is above reproach is not enough to contain the sense of compromise that results from the failure of the societies to which we consent to live up to their ideals. Something else is required, namely the idea of and the commitment to "the cultivation of a new mode of human being" that he finds in Emersonian perfectionism. 13 To that extent that this perfectionism provides resources to deal with the sense of compromise produced by the inevitable shortcomings of our actual democracies, Cavell argues that it is not only compatible with democracy but also essential to it.
At the same time, he is impelled to respond to Rawls' dismissal of perfectionism in A Theory of Justice, even though Rawls understands perfectionism in a different way to Emerson and Nietzsche. For Rawls, perfectionism is taken to be a teleological principle of distribution, namely one that distributes the benefits and obligations of political society in order to realize a form or forms of human excellence. Such a principle, he says, comes in two versions. In its moderate version, per- what one is and an aspiration to something "higher and more human," where this does not refer to some other individual or class of individuals but rather to a future 
Perfectionism and Democracy according to Cavell
Up to this point, Cavell's argument with the Rawls of A Theory of Justice amounts to pointing out that the perfectionism dismissed is not the Emerson-Nietzsche conception of perfectionism, and that there is nothing about the latter that makes it intolerable to "the life of justice in a constitutional democracy." 24 He later considers the objection that Rawls's focus is on social institutions and that his principles of justice are addressed to the basic structure of society rather than to personal conversation between individuals. As a result, it might be argued, the concerns of Nietzsche and Emerson are not those of Rawls. Cavell agrees but also disagrees in saying "This is important, but it does not seem to me enough to say." 25 The more that needs to be said is summed up in his claim that Emersonian perfectionism is not merely consistent with "the life of justice in a constitutional democracy but essential to that life." 26 He argues that A Theory of Justice acknowledges the role of an ongoing conversation of justice in a democratic society and that Emersonian perfectionism is a matter of public importance because of the role it plays in this conversation. In order to reconstruct his argument for the public importance of perfectionism, we need to take into account three further elements of his reading of Rawls: the conversation of justice, utopianism and the role of consent. us an ideal theory of justice in relation to which actually existing societies will inevitably fall short, Cavell concludes that it implies that citizens inevitably will be disappointed in actual democratic societies. His criticism of Rawls is that a complete version of his Utopianism should allow a role for perfectionism of the Emersonian - By saying that consent to society is neither unrestricted nor restricted and that its content is part of the conversation of justice, I take Cavell to be suggesting that one cannot consent to principles of justice independently of consenting, or not, to the society in which these are imperfectly realized. On the one hand, in the absence of consent and therefore commitment to the society, why would we care whether or not it was just? On the other hand, since consent can be for- The deeper purpose of this argument is to challenge the suggestion that one can distinguish sharply the conversation about the principles of justice that Rawls assigns to the hypothetical original position and the ongoing conversation about matters of basic justice that is characteristic of the political life of democratic society. Or to put the matter another way, Cavell may be taken to argue that the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is more complicated than we might at first suppose.
On the basis of these three ideas -conversation of justice, utopianism, consent -we can reconstruct the outlines of Cavell's case for saying that his perfectionism is not merely consistent with democratic social life but essential to it. Cavell summarizes the reasons that perfectionism is essential in suggesting that, for Emerson, perfectionism is part of the training for democracy. Not the part that must internalize the principles of justice and practice the role of the democratic citizen -that is clearly required, so obviously that the Emersonian may take offense at the idea that this aspect of things is even difficult […] . I understand the training and character and friendship Emerson requires for democracy as preparation to withstand not its rigors but its failures, character to keep the democratic hope alive in the face of disappointment with it. 33 He points out that in A Theory of Justice Rawls notes that existing constitutions are bound to fall short of what is just and that, importantly, "the measure of departure Nietzsche draw attention. This is shame at the realization that our social practices do not live up to our ideals, leading to the conclusion that "change is called for and to be striven for, beginning with myself" even though at the same time we consent to the way things are and are compromised by this consent. 37 Cavell contrasts this complex experience of shame, compromise and aspiration to change with Rawls's moral vision of a life lived beyond reproach. The restricted point of view of the citizen who aspires to a life lived beyond reproach is inadequate to the demands of justice, which require the kind of commitment to change, both at a personal and a social level, that is ex- Cavell contrasts his approach to the inevitable disappointments of actually existing democracy to Rawls's idea that the citizen of a well-ordered democracy should aim to live a life that is "above reproach." He denies that looking for a life beyond reproach is sufficient to contain the sense of compromise that is produced by living in a less than just society and suggests that perfectionism, as he understands it, offers a way of dealing with this sense of compromise by keeping alive the democratic hope in the face of disappointment. Secondly, he argues that the conversation over the degree of justice in a society that inevitably falls short of the ideal must take place but also must not be resolved, "because disagreement, and separateness of position, is to be allowed its satisfactions, reached and expressed in particular ways." 39 In this sense, the task of responsibility for or towards justice implies a commitment to responsiveness that is exemplified the perfectionism that Cavell seeks to defend.
Democracy and political perfectionism in the later Rawls
In Rawls's later work the idea and the ideal of public reason comes to occupy the central place in his conception of a well-ordered democratic society, at the expense of the argument from the original position. 40 In this sense, the conversation of justice plays an even more important role in his thought. The idea of public reason specifies the manner in which citizens should defend their political views on constitutional matters and in addressing fundamental questions of justice such as those involving the basic structure of society. In their public deliberation, citizens in a well-ordered and pluralist society must respect a duty of civility and offer reasons to one another in terms that all can reasonably be expected to endorse. This implies relatively stringent restrictions on the kinds of reasons that citizens can put forward in arguing their case, namely reasons couched in terms of one or other of the available political conceptions of justice. The ideal of public reason is satisfied whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable. In this way, they fulfil what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. 41 Commentators such as Anthony Laden take this to show that Rawls is less concerned to elaborate a philosophical theory of justice to be handed down to citizens as a template against which to judge existing institutions and policies than to outline the kinds of reasons in support of particular principles of justice or particular applications of those principle that might be offered to "fellow reasonable citizens, taken not as stripped-down rational choosers but in all their diversity and complexity." 42 Rawls suggests that this idea of public reason "specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government's relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood." 43 The idea of public reason at the heart of Rawls's later political philosophy specifies how the conversation of justice among citizens is to be conducted. However, this does not constrain the many forms of conversation among citizens that may take place as part of the background culture, and on the basis of particular moral views. Nietzsche. It concludes with a question that asks the reader whether they would un- what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?" -ibid., 62-63. der any circumstances desire the life lived under the conditions of social conformity as Mill describes them. This is, Cavell suggests, "Perfectionism's question, its reading of the cry of freedom, for a life of one's own, that one consents to with one's own voice." 46 The implication that he draws from Mill's posing of this question is that individual citizens must each give their answers to this question before they can properly know what it is to which they give their consent. Finally, Cavell's moral conception of the conversation of justice is apparent in the final lecture in his use of Ibsen's A Doll's House, which he describes at one point as representative of "the state and aspiration of the moral life." 47 His discussion of the play is intended to answer questions about the conversation of justice within a democratic and (sufficiently) just form of social life, where it is assumed that these are moral questions.
Throughout these lectures, Cavell treats the political community as a moral community and the relation of individuals to the society in which they live as a moral relationship. By contrast, the later Rawls's conception of a well-ordered society does not envisage this as a moral community or as presupposing agreement on any particular comprehensive moral point of view or way of life. Rather, the point of departure for political liberalism is the fact of "conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines." 48 The public justification of a conception of justice is possible because of an overlapping consensus achieved on the basis of diverse religious, philosophical and moral views. Overlapping consensus does not mean agreement on particular principles that are already implicit in the diverse comprehensive views present in a given society, nor does it mean compromise between these views. Rather, it refers to the kind of publicly endorsed consensus that occurs when reasonable members of a political society affirm a particular conception of justice that they can each justify in the terms of their respective comprehensive views, and when they are aware that others do likewise. Rawls suggests that only the achievement of such a consensus justifies the legitimate exercise of coercive political power. Achieving such a consensus provides citizens with "the deepest and most reasonable basis of social unity available to us as members of a modern democratic society." 49 This is political unity rather than the unity of a moral community. What then becomes of Cavell's argument for the necessity of Emersonian perfectionism under the conditions of just political community as described by Rawls's political liberalism? Moral perfectionism may well be consistent with the conditions of democratic political community especially when we take into account Cavell's description of it as not so much a competing theory of the moral life but rather a dimension of the moral life that concerns the state of one's soul. However, to the extent that Rawls imagines consensus on liberal conceptions of justice to be possible for citizens with divergent moral points of view, it is difficult to see how moral perfectionism can be "essential" for democratic life. There is no reason to assume that those committed to fixed and unchanging conceptions of self will be excluded from the possibility of consensus. As we noted above, Rawls relies on a political conception of persons that supposes them to have a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good. However, a capacity to revise one's conception of the good and to transform oneself does not require that it be exercised and it is not a requirement of the democratic consensus that it should be. Rawls' understanding of reasonable social unity as political rather than moral has further consequences for the way in which we should understand his conception of a sufficiently just and democratic society, and the nature of the conversation of justice that takes place in such a society. Consider Cavell's suggestion that Rawls's achievement is to give us a means by which "the justice of justice can be assessed." 50 It is true that Rawls always conceived of his conception of justice as a standard against which the justice of existing institutions could be measured. However, the suggestion that he provides a means by which the justice of justice can be assessed is misleading if it is taken to imply that the argument from the original position gives us a fixed and ahistorical template against which the justice of existing institutions can be assessed. In his "Reply to Habermas," Rawls notes that all societies are more or less unjust and agrees with Habermas that the idea of a just society "is a project to be carried out." 51 Recourse to the idea of a hypothetical original position is a device that enables citizens to determine acceptable principles of justice and, on that basis, work out what would be a just constitution under reasonably favourable conditions. If as is generally the case it turns out that a just constitution cannot be fully realized under Conditions, 25. 51. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 398. actual historical and political conditions, the theory of justice "sets up the aim of long-term political reform." 52 The disappointment to which Cavell argues perfectionism provides a response will still be present, at least for some citizens. However, political liberalism provides other resources in order to address this disappointment, not all of which require the particular conception of the moral self associated with Emersonian perfectionism.
One of these concerns the scope of the conversation of justice. The idea of a just constitution as an ideal to be worked towards is of course compatible with an a-historical conception of the nature of justice. Against this, I suggest, for the later Rawls, the very standard against which the justice of society is to be measured is itself part of the ongoing conversation of justice. He is explicit that the original position is a "device of representation" that serves as "a means of public reflection and self-clarification." 53 It is open to the present not only because, as Cavell suggests, it permits individual citizens to ask whether the present society, with all its deficiencies in relation to the ideal, is nevertheless worth its burdens, as compared with the burdens that would be encountered in a state of nature, but also because it allows them to ask what principles of justice they would now be prepared to accept, subject to the constraints of the veil of ignorance. Moreover, it enables that question to be posed at any point in the history of the society concerned. The political conception of justice in a given society, Rawls insists, "is always subject to being checked by our reflective considered judgments." 54 Citizens are autonomous when they live under a constitution that accords with principles of justice they would choose. When the constitution or laws passed under it are seen to be unjust in particular ways, "citizens with reason strive to become more autonomous by doing what, in their historical and social circumstances, can be reasonably and rationally seen to advance their full autonomy." 55 In the same way that, as Cavell notes, for Kant acting not merely in accordance with the moral law but out of respect for that law is "an unreachable ideal relation to be striven for in relation to the moral law," so is the achievement of a just political regime an ideal and an ongoing task. 56 In other words, the later Rawls agrees with Cavell that the conver- This principle links the legitimacy of political power closely to the requirements of a well-ordered society: a society is "well-ordered" when it is effectively regulated by a publicly justified conception (or conceptions) of justice. Rawls agrees that legitimacy and justice are different concepts but denies that there can be a conception of procedural legitimacy that is independent of substantive questions. Democratic decisions are legitimate if they are enacted in accordance with legitimate democratic procedures. These procedures may not be just, but they must be "sufficiently just in view of the circumstances and social conditions": even though neither procedures nor the laws which result need be acceptable "by a strict standard of justice," they cannot be "too gravely unjust." 60 At some point, the injustice of the political constitution or the injustice of the outcomes of a legitimate democratic procedure will corrupt the legitimacy of the regime. But at what point? Is the persistence of a constitution that makes no mention of the indigenous inhabitants of a country established by colonization, and in the adoption of which no indigenous citizens were consulted, sufficiently unjust to undermine legitimacy? Rawls does not provide criteria by which we might answer such questions. However, he does provide reasons for thinking that such questions should also be considered part of the conversation of justice.
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls is explicit about the utopian dimension of his political liberalism. He identifies a number of purposes served by political philosophy. One of these is the "realistically utopian" task of "probing the limits In his last writings, Rawls explicitly acknowledges that public reason is an historical phenomenon. The content of public reason is given by the family of publicly acceptable conceptions of justice that can be objects of overlapping consensus in a given society at a given time. This content will reflect the settled convictions of members of the society as well as the background culture that sustains efforts to systematize and theorize such judgments and that provides conceptions of the nature and business of government. It provides the discursive frameworks within which citizens and public officials can argue in ways that are not beholden to their particular moral, philosophical or religious views and that each can reasonably expect that others could endorse. At any given moment, what can properly be said within the sphere of public 
